Civil Society in Peril: The Burmese Case
Phyo Win Latt
The General Concept and Theory of Civil Society

The term "Civil Society" is believed to be used for the fires time by Seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in his treatise Leviathan. Its connotative vicissitudes, its origins and previous political uses from Hegel and Marx and beyond in a sense reflect a microcosm both of political and social science theory. For a period reflection on civil society was out of style, an anachronistic concept replaced by more fashionable intellectual formulations. Collins Dictionary of Sociology defines civil society in Marxian and Hegelian sense, as "a realm intermediate between the family and the state". As the modern world odder change the definition and domain of civil society also expends. The changing role of global civil society has redefined the concepts of democracy. After the collapse of communism in the late 80s, the civil society of formerly communist controlled regions needed to rebuild, since it was disproved under the regimes. Political democracy has taken root around the world to a formidable extent. As Robert Putnam in his book Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy said "civil society consists of the diverse autonomous interest groups that can exert pressure on the state. The creation of a civil society is critical for the effective performance of democracy." Not only are civil societies rising up in previously repressed areas, there is also a culture of global civil society with an explosion in the number and forms of activities of NGOs and other groups focus on issues like human rights and good governance. Such a turn of trend could only be seen as impossible a few years ago. Now the term civil society came to be realized as a reference to sources of resistance to and the domain of social life and livelihood, which needs to be protected against globalization era.
Civil society is a contested concept supported both by the Right and the Left. For the Right a civil society supports neoliberalism doctrine, which shifts state responsibility onto organs of civil society and rejects the notion of universal citizenship entitlement. Within a Rightist position, the middle class has also, at times, appropriated civil society to further the agendas of middle class elitism. The Left too supports, a lively and active civil society based on emancipatory, democratic ideals, which actively engages in formulating and developing policies rooted in the principles of social justice and of human rights. Organs of civil society in this regards act as watchdogs for the poor and marginalized by regulating the forces of the state and the market; a civil society that, in the view of Howell and Pearce express a critical approach to the global economy’. It is the latter view of civil society that is reflected in the global standards.

According to Robert W. Cox, the bottom-up movement in civil society becomes the counter weight to the hegemonic and autocratic type of governance. The balancing between top-down approach and bottom-up approach in civil society and it's tendency to sway towards right-wing populism and covert world result in distinct types of state/society configurations with different implications for civil society. The modern civil society is not just a collection of groups, but especially in democratic societies, it is an organised system of social actors, that often have a transactional dimension in their activities and it expanded the governance agenda in both local level and multi level. Such changing trend with the decline of the power of institutional governance and rise of civil society makes the norms of democracy reconsidered. Self organized local associations like parent-teacher associations watch dogs, and advocacy groups are more tend to demand and receive accountability than disorganized individuals. According to Fukuyama' "civil society can degenerate into rent-seeking interest groups whose goal is not greater accountability but an increase in the scope of government subsidies or the substitution of government for civil society. Which of these outcomes prevails depends less on institutional design than on the nature of civil society itself."

NGOs and other civil society actors attempt to influence the policies and practices of consumers, companies, states, and international institutions in the process of advocacy, for the sake of their beneficiaries. NGO advocacy is based upon policy analysis, research, and the channeling of information. Since the advocacy has effects on macro level policy making process it is effective than down top approach. Nowadays NGOs have become more and more involved in transnational advocacy networks that link a range of actors from different countries and communities, in order to achieve their developmental aims. As NGOs have gained a higher profile through their involvement in transnational advocacy networks, they increasingly face challenges about their roles in the international policy process and their rights to participate in the shaping of global governance. That legitimacy means a socially constructed quality to NGO's by states. And the states hold sovereign based legitimacy and legitimacy is connected with sovereignty and states' sovereignty may be undermined by the practice of NGO, so it is difficult for them to be regarded as legitimate. Moreover, in some countries which believe the social welfare, public health, and development programs are only the responsibility of governments. And this concept makes no place for the NGOs to become legitimate contributors to development.

A Backlash Against the Civil Society

Autocratic regimes been seeing the civil society as a specter to their political power for so long. But now they have decided to fight back. Earlier this year, in January, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law a controversial new bill imposing heightened controls on local and NGOs operating in the country. The new legislation, which requires all NGOs in Russia to inform the government in advance about every project they intend to conduct, is another marker of the country's dispiriting slide back toward authoritarianism. The law is also a sign of an equally disturbing and much broader trend. After two decades of the steady expansion of democracy-building programs around the world, a growing number of governments are starting to crack down on such activities within their borders. These strongmen, some of them elected officials, have begun to publicly denounce Western democracy assistance as illegitimate political meddling. They have started expelling or harassing Western NGOs and prohibiting local groups from taking foreign funds, or have started punishing them for doing so. This mounting counterattack has yet to combine into a formal or organized movement. But its advocates are clearly learning from and feeding off of one another.

The recent color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan and the widespread doubt that U.S. groups such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, and the Open Society Institute played a key behind-the-scenes role in fomenting these upheavals have clearly helped trigger the backlash. Politicians from China to Zimbabwe have publicly cited concerns about such events spreading to their own shores as justification for new restrictions on Western aid to NGOs and opposition groups. Yet there is something broader at work than just a fear of orange revolution (Ukraine's revolution came to be known as the Orange Revolution). The way that US President George W. Bush is making democracy promotion a central theme of his foreign policy has clearly contributed to the unease such efforts (and the idea of democracy promotion itself) are creating around the world. Some autocratic governments have won substantial public sympathy by arguing that opposition to Western democracy promotion is resistance not to democracy itself, but to American interventionism. Moreover, the damage that the Bush administration has done to the global image of the United States as a symbol of democracy and human rights by repeatedly violating the rule of law at home and abroad has further weakened the legitimacy of the democracy-promotion cause.


The Situation of Civil Society in Myanmar

Background

In Myanmar, the struggles for independence created the rudiments of civil society in the form of the various organizations that challenged the colonial rulers. When the British invaded and established a colonial administration, they imposed and enforced many restrictions for the purpose of political and military control. Although controlling the population and limiting freedoms had been not more than a regular practice during the Burmese monarchy, the British were more effective in institutionalizing control and limitations of public freedoms. These restrictions i.e. limiting freedom of association, speech, movement and other rights hindered the growth of civil society actors.

But this restriction didn't last longer as educated urban Burmese growing up during the colonial administration were exposed to the practices of forming modern organizations and became more familiar with these practices; they showed a desire to create their own organizations for their own purposes, sometimes as a direct challenge to colonial control. For example, during the early part of the colonial administration, in 1906, the first modern, Buddhist NGO was formed – the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA). It began as a student group focusing mostly on religious topics, but later switched to emphasize political issues. They successfully led a campaign to ban footwear in all pagoda premises, using the opportunity to try to form an anti-colonial political movement. The origins of modern civil society were partially rooted in colonial resistance. After independence, civil society organizations began to multiply in urban areas. Many trade unions, professional associations and groups with a range of objectives were formed in the 1950s. NGOs and CBOs were apparently forming at a faster rate than at any other time in the country’s history. We can see civil society did develop under democratic Burma. It seems to have been basically an urban phenomenon, except for the religious groups that continued in the villages but were also prevalent in the cities, many of which were socially extended, agglutinated villages. Pro¬fes¬sio¬nal and other organizations were formed and flourished in an era where considerable space did exist between the state and the society. That space was somewhat circumscribed because of three factors: the heritage of laws from the colonial period that were used to suppress political dissent and the independence movement, the insurgencies that prompted immediate concerns for state security, and a tradition in which state intervention was tolerated. Social space did, however, exist. There were, of course, close, interpenetrating links bet­ween the civil society groups and the government. This was to be expected, because with a relatively small elite group and an extended family system, the relationships between the private and public spheres were often close. In politics as well, there were in the past close familial ties between members of the insurgencies and the government at the highest levels. In addition to the formation of civil society, however, the government and the political opposition parties as well mobilized the public through the generation of mass organizations linked to the political process.

The Changing Trend

After the coup of General Ne Win in 1962, civil society was significantly changed. The military regime subsequently imposed restrictions on many individual freedoms, and civil society organizations found themselves threatened. Local NGOs and CBOs retreated into a shell for several decades in order to survive. Some forms of civil society, such as labor unions and people’s movements, were virtually wiped out. However, as this research illustrates, civil society survived and new organizations were forming continuously during this period, albeit at a much slower rate than before or after. And they adapted the way they function to the situation they faced. During the SLORC/SPDC era, the government loosened some of the central controls on the economy and made attempts to encourage or tolerate foreign investment and foreign organizations to enter the country. A few international NGOs trickled into Myanmar in the early 1990s, and a larger flow entered in the late 1990s and first few years after 2000. Also, some of the severe restrictions on society appeared to soften somewhat, participatory forms of community organization appeared to be more tolerated, and local and international NGOs were allowed to work at community level. In fact, many development workers have commented on the obviously higher level of government tolerance at community level in Myanmar than in some other countries in Asia and elsewhere. During this honeymoon period, NGOs were also allowed increased access to sensitive border areas and to parts of the country where they could not previously work. The numerous ceasefire agreements signed between the SPDC and armed ethnic groups during the 1990s also contributed to increasing access for NGOs around the country. But after 1996 unsuccessful student uprising, the iron grip of SLORC started to tighten its restrictions on NGOs and civil society.

In September 15, 1993, SLORC sponsored to form an organization called the Union Solidarity and Develop­ment Association (USDA). Just about two weeks after the announcement to hold a national convention to write a new constitution, and is likely to be related, with the USDA as a natural and national means to disseminate support for that new law when it is finally announced. The USDA is registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, and is not a political party. It's explicitly mandated role is to support the activities and policies of the military, and the Chairman of the SLORC is the patron. It receives both direct and indirect support from the government at various levels, although it engages in businesses to provide funds for its activities. It is not simply an 'apolitical' political organiza­tion, however. It supports the state but has significant community development and educational components to attract membership. It tends to concentrate on youth, and is reported to have over 22 million members so far. The opposition claims that the USDA has been mobilized to protest the National League for Democracy's activities, and Aung San Suu Kyi personally and there is no question that the activities attributed to it in the SLORC controlled press which are to support state policies directly. That the SLORC in October-November 1997 prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from personally visiting local brunches of the NLD to expand its youth activities may indicate that the SLORC is fearful of youth both as a potentially mobilized disruptive political force and that they wanted no competition with the youth activities of the USDA.

This is the way SLORC has created its own civil society in the guise of the USDA. The SLORC would, and has, strongly disagreed with charges that membership is forced, but other say that there are informal, non-punitive but socially desirable incentives for joining. The potential for the USDA lies in its support for any of the SLORC policies or actions, including potentially the approval of a new constitution at some unspecified date, and the elections for a legislature that will be required. The SLORC in this case, as in many others, seems to be following the Suharto's model of Indonesia, which has allowed the military to run the country for over thirty years. There are some private groups in Myanmar, but most of the major ones are state sponsored and controlled, such as the Maternal and Child Welfare Association, are under government influence, as the ousted General Khin Nyunt's wife had been appointed as the head of that organization. Other groups are languished by the state and are clearly not independent and are at this stage no forces for pluralism.

For NGOs the SLORC directly and indirectly pronounces its position via its media. These international NGOs or local NGOs which run by international donation are seen by the SLORC as axe-handles or willing minions and they are used by rich countries as a tool to interfere and disrupt the internal affairs of host countries. And the junta also assumes that these NGOs are getting money from their donors by doing some show off projects in Myanmar, so they are regarded as exploiting their country by this means.

Recent Situation

The situation now are becoming tighter and tighter as the regime continues to impose many restrictions on the mobility of the civil society. Recently the regime's Ministry of Planning and Economic Development released the first formal set of guidelines for humanitarian operations in Myanmar on February 7, during a meeting with UN and INGOs in Yangon. The restrictions listed in these guidelines would heavily affect international aid operations. The documents said these organizations would be forced to choose Burmese staff from military-prepared lists, operations would be overseen by a special committees made up of civil groups including USDA and Women's Affairs association and all international field workers would have to be accompanied by a government official during in-country visits or inspections. A high-level NGO staff in interview with Mizzima News said, "The restrictions if imposed as they stand will have serious repercussions on our activities. Greatly reducing them as we would have difficulty operating within the parameters of the humanitarian principles to which we must all comply. Donors would be more hesitant to support operations in [Burma],"


Any Solution?

It is still a hot debate on how to save the perilous situation of civil society inside Myanmar. There are some who want to wait until the regime collapse to rebuild the civil society and there are some who want to do humanitarian assistance programs to save the situation. For Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, who is the special rapporteur of the situation of human rights in Myanmar, wrote in his report submitted to secretary general of the United Nations on 7 February 2006, concerning his latest findings and suggestions, he said that" it would be counterproductive to wait until the end of the political transition process to empower civil society. As in many similar humanitarian emergencies in nations undergoing political transition processes to democracy, the main challenge for the international community is to prevent social capital from being completely exhausted. As well as addressing the suffering of the people today, it is necessary to protect and strengthen the ability of communities and individuals to participate in the eventual political transition."







Bibliography
Tuck, Richard. (1989). Hobbes. Past Masters series. Oxford University Press.

Jary, Julia. & Jary, David. (2005). Collins Internet-Linked Dictionary Of Sociology (3 ed.). Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers.

Pye, Lucian W. (1999). Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Exploring Asia. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXIX: 4(Spring 1999), 763-782.

Howell J, Pearce J (2001). Civil Society and Development: a Critical Exploration. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cox, Robert. W. (1999). Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium. Review of International Studies, 25, 3-28.

Fukuyama, Francis. (2004). State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Carothers, Thomas. (2006). The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion. (regulation of nongovernmental organizations) Foreign Affairs, 85(2), 55.

Furnivall, J. S. (1960) The Governance of Modern Burma, Institute of Pacific Relations, NY US

Steinberg, David I (2001) Burma, The State of Myanmar, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, US

Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute. (1999). Strengthening civil society in Burma: possibilities and dilemmas for international NGOs. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books.

Steinberg, David. (1997) “The Union Solidarity Development Association: Mobilisation and orthodoxy in Myanmar” in Burma Debate, Jan/Feb 1997.

Purcell, Marc. (1999). "Axe-Handles or Willing Minions?" International NGOs in Burma. In Transnational Institute (TNI). Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) (Ed.), Strengthening civil society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (pp. 69-102). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Curtis, Jessicah. (2006) “Confusion over Burma's new UN and NGO guidelines” in Mizzima News, 13 Feb 2006

Pinheiro, Paulo Sérgio. (2006). Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar (No. E/CN.4/2006/34). New York: The United Nations.